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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-1893 
 
EDWIN MALDONADO; MARIA DELORES MALDONADO, 
individually and as next friends of Ana Maldonado, Pablo 
Maldonado, Edwin Maldonado, Rey Maldonado, Y esenia 
Maldonado, and Jose Maldonado, and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated; MARIA ORTIZ; MICHAEL ORTIZ, 
individually and as next friends of Julie Ortiz, Michael 
Ortiz, and Angelica Ortiz, and on behalf of all other 
similarly situated; KENSINGTON WELFARE RIGHTS 
UNION; PHILADELPHIA WELFARE RIGHTS 
ORGANIZATION, on behalf of themselves and their 
members; TRAVELER'S AID SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA, 
individually and on behalf of its clients 
 
v. 
 
FEATHER O. HOUSTOUN, Secretary of the 
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE; 
DON JOSE STOVALL, Executive Director of the 
PHILADELPHIA BOARD OF ASSISTANCE, both in their 
official capacities, 
 
Appellants 
 
STAPLETON, ROSENN, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, 
Judge, United States Court of International T rade* 
 
(Filed June 27, 2001) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, United States Court of 
International Trade, sitting by designation. 
  
OPINION SUR MOTION for ATTORNEYS' FEES 
and COSTS 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge: 
 
The determination of a reasonable attor ney's fee for a 
prevailing party under a fee shifting statute generally is a 
disagreeable and tedious task, especially wher e the fee 
petition is vigorously contested and the petition is in behalf 
of numerous lawyers who worked on the appeal. The fee 
motion before us claims over 550 hours of attor ney time 
expended exclusively for work on the appeal. W e are 
required to analyze the motion and supporting data to 
ascertain whether the amount claimed is reasonable. The 
motion is especially troublesome because in this single 
issue appeal, ten lawyers represented the plaintiffs and 
claim compensation for not only an aggregate of 550.13 
hours of service on the appeal, but an additional claim of 
25.68 hours for services expended on the fee petition. The 
total sum claimed is $100,996.40 in attorneys' fees and 
$648.74 in costs. 
 
The plaintiffs, welfare recipients in Pennsylvania, brought 
a class action in 1997 in the United States District Court 
challenging the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's two-tier 
durational residency requirement limiting the amount of 
public assistance benefits for new residents. The plaintiffs 
claimed that the two-tier welfare scheme violated their 
constitutional rights to travel, to equal pr otection, and to 
non-discriminatory treatment under the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. They moved for class certification and 
an injunction. The plaintiffs sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, naming the State Secretary of Public Welfare and 
the Executive Director of the Philadelphia Boar d of 
Assistance as defendants. The District Court held that the 
two-tier welfare scheme violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, granted the 
injunction, and certified the class action. On the basis of a 
stipulation of counsel, the District Court or dered the 
defendants to pay $248,000 for the plaintiffs' fees for 
services rendered in that court, and costs. The 
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Commonwealth appealed and, after briefing and oral 
argument, we affirmed. See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 
F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
After our decision, the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari to review Roe v. Anderson, 134 
F.3d 1400 (9th Cir. 1998), a decision which struck down 
similar provisions in a California statute. 
 
Based on our decision and the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) 
(affirming the judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d 
1400 (9th Cir. 1998)), we now have befor e us the plaintiffs' 
motion for attorneys' fees and costs in connection with 
their appeal to this court. 
 
I. 
 
The plaintiffs (appellees) claim that they ar e entitled to 
the attorneys' fees and costs requested because they 
prevailed on the appeal within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983. See 42 U.S.C. S 1988(b) (providing, in the court's 
discretion, a reasonable attor ney's fee to a prevailing party 
to a S 1983 action). As we stated above, they also prevailed 
in the District Court where the trial judge, acting on a 
stipulation of counsel for the parties, enter ed an order on 
January 3, 2000, awarding plaintiffs $248,000 in full 
satisfaction of fees and costs incurred in that court. 
Regrettably, we have no stipulations in the motion before 
us; on the contrary, the appellants (effectively the State) 
strenuously oppose the motion in all of its aspects. 
 
The State contends that the fees requested ar e "grossly 
unreasonable." It acknowledges that the appellees are 
entitled to receive a fee award, but asserts that the fee 
request is "grotesquely inflated." The State emphasizes that 
the appeal presented only a single issue which, although 
important, was not particularly complicated, and tur ned 
largely on the Court's construction of Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618 (1969). Specifically, the State ar gues that an 
award for the hours claimed for preparation of the brief at 
oral argument should be substantially r educed, and that 
the appeal's single issue, "which had alr eady been 
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thoroughly explored in the District Court," reasonably 
should have required no more than 100 hours. The State 
also contends that the hourly rate claimed for the attorneys 
is excessive and that the allowable hourly rate for all 
lawyers, including those of a private law fir m, should 
conform to the rates of Community Legal Services (CLS), 
which have been widely accepted as fairly reflecting the 
prevailing market rates in Philadelphia. The State asserts 
that attorneys of Dechert, Price & Rhoads pr ovided 
insufficient support for their high rates claimed. 
 
On the other hand, the appellees assert that the issues 
on appeal "were complex and difficult," required familiarity 
with a large body of case law, state statutes and 
regulations, that the case was not "over -lawyered" by the 
plaintiffs, and that they have "alr eady substantially reduced 
their hours to account for any inefficiencies cr eated by a 
multi-firm team." They further assert that the time they 
spent on the appeal was reasonable, and that the State's 
lack of cooperation in the preparation of the appendix 
added to the expense. They also argue that the hourly rate 
claimed is reasonable and that the State should be ordered 
to pay Dechert "at its normal rates, which are set by the 
market." 
 
II. 
 
In assessing the reasonableness of a claimed fee in cases 
like this, we use the "lodestar" formula, which requires 
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a 
reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 
424 (1983); Pennsylvania v. Delaware V alley Citizens' 
Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986); Pennsylvania 
Environ. Def., 152 F.3d at 232."When the applicant for a 
fee has carried his burden of showing that the claimed 
rates and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting 
product is presumed to be the reasonable fee to which 
counsel is entitled." Delaware V alley Citizens' Council, 478 
U.S. at 564 (internal quotation omitted). 
 
In calculating the hours reasonably expended, a court 
should "review the time charged, decide whether the hours 
set out were reasonably expended for each of the particular 
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purposes described and then exclude those that ar e 
`excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.' " Public 
Int. Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. W indall, 51 F.3d 1179, 
1188 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted); see also 
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F .2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990) 
("The district court should exclude hours that ar e not 
reasonably expended."). "Hours that would not generally be 
billed to one's own client are not properly billed to an 
adversary." Public Interest Gr oup, 51 F.3d at 1188. Thus, we 
have a positive and affirmative function in the fee fixing 
process, not merely a passive role. 
 
Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is calculated 
according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant 
community. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984); 
Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d at 1183. The court "should assess 
the experience and skill of the prevailing party's attorneys 
and compare their rates to the rates pr evailing in the 
community for similar services by lawyers of r easonably 
comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Dellarciprete, 
892 F.2d at 1183. The prevailing party"bears the burden of 
establishing by way of satisfactory evidence, `in addition to 
[the] attorney's own affidavits,' . . . that the requested 
hourly rates meet this standard." W ashington v. 
Philadelphia Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F .3d 1031, 1035 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Blum v. Stenson , 465 U.S. 886, 895 
n.11 (1984)). The starting point in ascertaining a 
reasonable hourly rate "is the attor ney's usual billing rate, 
but this is not dispositive." Public Inter est Group, 51 F.3d at 
1185. 
 
In analyzing this heated controversy, some concepts and 
precepts are indisputable. The plaintif fs presented an 
excellent case and a high quality brief. Accor dingly, they 
are entitled to all hours "reasonably expended on the 
litigation." West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 
898 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Hershey v. 
Echerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1993). The converse is also 
true; they are not entitled to compensation for hours 
unreasonably expended on the litigation. 
 
III. 
 
We do not question the accuracy of counsel's records. 
Our principal concern is whether the time claimed is 
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reasonable for the services perfor med, a concern which is 
accentuated because of the many lawyers involved in behalf 
of the plaintiffs. Ordinarily, this appeal could have been 
briefed and argued by a single lawyer or two. Lawyers 
should understand that although the likelihood of success 
in a fee shifting case may be promising, the pr ospects of 
payment by a defendant with a deep pocket or a defendant 
with tax collecting powers should not encourage the 
utilization of an excess number of lawyers on the 
preparation of the appeal. Nor is work on the appeal 
intended to be a training school for law students or 
embryonic lawyers at the expense of the losing party. A 
reviewing court must adhere to the statutory and case law 
standards. As do the district courts, an appellate court also 
has a positive and affirmative function in the fee fixing 
process. 
 
In analyzing the services rendered on this appeal, we 
divide them into categories: 1) research and briefing; 2) 
preparation of the supplemental appendix; 3) oral 
argument; and 4) communication and confer ences. We will 
determine a reasonable hourly rate and then review the 
fees claimed for preparing the fee petition. 
 
1. Research and Briefing 
 
The facts before this court on the underlying appeal 
comprised two short paragraphs. The single issue before us 
on the appeal, although significant, was framed in these 
words: "Whether Pennsylvania violates the Constitution by 
providing that, for one year after their arrival in 
Pennsylvania, applicants for certain welfare benefits may 
receive only the amount they would have r eceived in their 
state of prior residence." We, ther efore, noted that we were 
"only to determine the constitutionality of the state 
statute," and that we only had to address the propriety of 
the District Court's legal conclusion in granting the 
injunction. 
 
In our analysis of the law on the right to travel, we stated 
in our written opinion, as did the District Court, that the 
seminal case on the subject of strict scrutiny of state 
durational residency requirements as prerequisite to 
eligibility for welfare benefits was Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
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U.S. 618 (1969). We observed that the Court r eaffirmed this 
decision five years later in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa 
County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). The holdings in those cases 
have never been overturned, and were very well known to 
legal scholars and those practicing public service law. They 
were binding precedent upon us in deciding this case. We 
believed then, and we have no reason to change our 
opinion now, that this case was important and inter esting, 
but not complex. This in no way alters plaintif fs' right to a 
reasonable fee for their services, but it does not justify 
excessive claims. The immediate and difficult question is 
whether the hours claimed are reasonable for the services 
performed. 
 
First, we note that the appellees' attorneys on appeal 
represented them in the District Court. Judge Newcomer 
had discussed the legal issue on appeal in a well-written 
and thorough opinion. See Maldonado v. Houstoun, 177 
F.R.D. 311 (E. D. Pa. 1997). In his opinion, Judge 
Newcomer cited the District Court opinion in Roe v. 
Anderson, 166 F. Supp. 977 (E. D. Cal. 1997) enjoining the 
enforcement of a similar statute. The Supr eme Court later 
affirmed Anderson in Saenz v. Roe, supra. The District 
Court also discussed at length Shapiro  and its progeny. See 
Maldonado, 177 F.R.D. at 323-33 (1997). 
 
Thus, much if not all of the pertinent law had been 
briefed and argued in the District Court, and the District 
Court opinion carefully and thoughtfully analyzed it. We 
are, therefore, stunned that over 550 hours are claimed for 
researching, briefing, conferring, pr eparing a supplemental 
appendix, and arguing the single constitutional issue before 
us. 
 
The appellees noted in their brief to this court that the 
State "has explicitly limited its arguments on appeal to the 
class's likelihood of success on the merits" and has waived 
the issues pertaining to the other three factors necessary to 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction. In addition, the 
salient cases and statute on the single issue to be argued 
by the State were set forth by the District Court in its 
opinion. The court analyzed at length Shapir o v. Thompson 
and its progeny, and discussed the criticism of Shapiro in 
Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 
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(1986), Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 
(1974), and a leading law review article by Thomas R. 
McCoy entitled "Recent Equal Protection Decisions -- 
Fundamental Right to Travel or `Newcomers' as a Suspect 
Class?" The District Court also discussed T odd Zubler's law 
review article on "The Right to Migrate and Welfare Reform: 
Time for Shapiro v. Thompson to Take a Hike." 
 
Thus, the researching and briefing of the law on the 
single uncomplicated issue before this court did not require 
creating or developing an original theory or analyzing 
obscure principles of law. Moreover , the burden rested on 
the State, not the appellees, in framing the issue and 
preparing the appendix. Notwithstanding, appellees' 
counsel claim an enormous amount of time for r esearching 
and briefing an issue which they had successfully tried, 
researched, and briefed in the District Court. 
 
True, the appellees prepared and submitted an excellent 
brief of 41 pages. The first 13 pages, however , essentially 
contain the appellee's statement of the issue, the counter- 
statement of the case, and a two-page summary of the 
argument. The remaining 28 pages contain the argument. 
Our arithmetic shows that the appellees claim an aggregate 
amount of 276.65 hours for research and briefing. Under 
the foregoing circumstances, we believe that a reasonable 
and generous amount of time for resear ch and briefing on 
the single issue, especially considering the r esearch and 
briefing in the District Court, and the pertinent law set 
forth in the District Court decision, is 120 hours. 
 
2. Supplemental Appendix 
 
Appellees claim 32.50 hours for the preparation of their 
appendix supplementing the State's appendix. Considering 
that the appellant had the burden of pr eparing and 
submitting the original appendix, we believe two nor mal 
work days should have been more than sufficient for the 
preparation of a supplemental appendix. W e will allow 16 
hours for this purpose. 
 
3. Oral Argument 
 
Appellees claim 169.35 hours in preparation for a twenty 
minute oral argument. This is the equivalent of slightly 
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more than 21 full eight-hour days. Susan Frietsche, who 
made the oral argument for the appellees, individually 
claimed 77.3 hours in preparation for the oral argument 
and one hour in court for making the argument. Her 
colleagues in the case claimed an aggregate of 72.05 hours 
preparing for the oral argument to be made by Frietsche 
who, although at the Bar for only six years when she 
argued this case before the court, had achieved an 
impressive record at college, law school, and in public 
service litigation. A total of 169.35 hours in pr eparation for 
an oral argument on a single issue that had been tried, 
briefed, and argued in the District Court is unacceptable. 
65.5 hours are claimed by Eliza Shapiro, and 15.25 hours 
by Sarah Moskowitz in preparation for oral ar gument. If a 
private client had agreed to pay for such services, so be it. 
But in fee shifting, there are standar ds to be maintained. 
See Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 
(11 Cir. 1988) (court should exclude hours that would be 
unreasonable to bill to a client, irrespective of counsel's 
experience, skill, or reputation). 
 
A reasonable fee for hours spent preparing for a legal 
argument should be limited to hours reasonably necessary 
for a lawyer to become familiarized with the facts and the 
law pertaining to the issue to be argued, an analysis of the 
opponent's argument, and questions anticipated to be 
posed by the court. Under the fee shifting statute, the 
losing party is expected to pay for hours reasonably spent 
in the argument and its preparation, but not for excessive 
hours, or hours spent in learning or excessively rehearsing 
appellate advocacy. We believe 24 hours for preparation for 
this oral argument, and two hours for attendance at oral 
argument, is fair and reasonable. 
 
4. Conferences and Communications 
 
Appellees also request payment for over 40 hours spent 
on telephones, conference calls, and meetings to plan 
strategy, and payment for over 80 hours of miscellaneous 
time. There is considerable question whether many of these 
activities, communications and conference calls were 
necessary at all. For reasons evident in Part IV of our 
opinion, we will not tarry in our analysis of these claims 
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but will allow 40 hours as generous and r easonable for all 
these purposes. 
 
5. Fee Petition 
 
We also believe that the time claimed for the preparation 
of a simple six-page fee petition, largely supplemented by 
affidavits of several counsel, resumes, and time sheets, is 
excessive. Again we will not set forth our r easons therefor 
at this point but will resolve the matter in Part IV hereof. 
 
6. Hourly Rate 
 
The appellees have the burden of establishing a 
reasonable hourly rate for each of the attor neys. Each of 
the parties offer very little evidence pertaining thereto. The 
fee schedule established by Community Legal Services, Inc. 
("CLS") "has been approvingly cited by the Third Circuit as 
being well developed and has been found by [the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania] to be a fair reflection of the 
prevailing market rates in Philadelphia." See Rainey v. 
Philadelphia Housing Auth., 832 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E. D. 
Pa. 1993)(citing Swaayze v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., No. 
91-2982, 1992 WL 81598, at N2 (E. D. Pa. Apr . 16, 1992)). 
The State has no objection to their use here. W e approve of 
those rates as reasonable in fixing the hourly rates in this 
case, and deny the hourly rates that are inconsistent with 
them. 
 
IV. 
 
In summary, we believe a reasonable number of hours for 
the services performed in behalf of the plaintiffs is as 
follows: 
 
          Procedure                            Hours 
          Research and briefing                120 
          Preparation of supplemental 
          appendix                              16 
          Preparation for oral argument         24 
          Attendance at oral argument            2 
          Telephone calls and conferences       40 
          Preparation for fee petition          10  
              Total reasonable hours           212 hours 
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In their Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' Motion, 
the State used the CLS fee schedule to adjust appellees' 
hourly rates where appropriate. We hold that the rates set 
forth in the CLS schedule are reasonable for the services 
performed in this case. 
 
The State's memorandum submits that a reasonable 
number of hours for the services perfor med in this appeal 
is an aggregate of 219.84 hours. Our independent analysis 
confirms that this figure is gener ous and not unreasonable. 
The State also has undertaken the difficult task of 
calculating the lodestar for each individual claimant; we 
deem their calculations to be reasonable and accurate. That 
calculation is as follows: 
 
ATTORNEY     HOURS    HOURLY RATE    LODESTAR 
McLaughlin   15.25      $250         $3,812.50 
Nosowsky     32.70      $140         $4,578.00 
Fitinides    35.59      $120         $4,270.80 
Terry        27.20      $130         $3,536.00 
Frietsche    28.60      $150         $4,290.00 
Shapiro      23.90      $90          $2,151.00 
Moskowitz     0.00      $60               0.00 
Weishaupt    22.35      $265         $5,922.75 
Stein        10.25      $275         $2,818.75 
Kreimer      24.00      $250         $6,000.00 
   TOTAL     219.84                 $37,379.80 
 
The State has no objection to the claim for costs of $678.74 
and we will allow it. 
 
With respect to the fee petition, the State asserts that the 
hours claimed should reflect a reduction of 50% because of 
the limited success on the fee petition. We have held "that 
the fee reduction rationale of Hensley. . . applies by force 
of the Court's reasoning to fees generated in the litigation 
of a fee petition, and compels us to treat the fee petition 
litigation as a separate entity subject to lodestar and 
Hensley reduction analysis." Institutionalized Juveniles v. 
Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 924 (3d Cir. 1985); 
accord, Durette v. Cohen, 790 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1986); see 
also West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., 898 F.2d at 
367. We believe that this proposal is r easonable, and 
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applying the rates we have already held to be r easonable, 
we approve the following sums: 
 
          McLaughlin   0.35 hours x $250 = $  87.50 
          Fitinides    5.85 hours x $120 = $ 702.00 
          Frietsche     1.4 hours x $150 = $ 210.00 
          Shapiro       0.4 hours x $90  = $  36.00 
          Weishaupt    4.45 hours x $265 = $1179.25 
          Kreimer      0.25 hours x $250 = $  62.50 
           TOTAL       12.7 hours          $2277.28 
 
V. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the lodestar pr oposed by the 
State is reasonable and award $37,379.80 as attorneys' 
fees for the work performed on appeal. W e will award 
$2277.28 for preparation of the fee petition. W e will award 
the full amount of costs claimed, $678.74; this amount is 
reasonable and uncontested. The State is dir ected to pay 
the same to individual counsel in the sums set forth above. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
          Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
          for the Third Circuit 
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